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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines Louisiana law regulating the circumstances
under which oil and gas activities may be conducted on co-owned
land or on land burdened by a co-owned mineral servitude.1 Although
this important topic has been considered in other writings,2 a more
current examination is in order because no prior commentary has
considered the significant amendments to the Louisiana Mineral Code
in 1988.
“Ownership of the same thing by two or more persons is
ownership in indivision.”3 Also known as co-ownership, the Civil
Code further provides that “[t]wo or more persons may own the
same thing in indivision, each having an undivided share.”4 A
person owning along with others an undivided interest in the same
thing is called a co-owner or an owner in indivision. For purposes
of ownership, a person must be a natural person or a juridical
person.5
“Tracts of land, with their component parts, are immovables.”6
Hence, land is a corporeal7 thing which is susceptible of being
owned in indivision.
Co-ownership of land might arise in a variety of ways. While
the most typical situation giving rise to co-ownership is that
resulting from a recognized mode of disposition or alienation of
land to two or more persons (such as sale, donation, or exchange),
it might also arise as a consequence of inheritance8 or divorce
1. First recognized by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Frost-Johnson
Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207 (La. 1922), a mineral servitude is now
codally defined as “the right of enjoyment of land belonging to another for the
purpose of exploring for and producing minerals and reducing them to
possession and ownership.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:21 (2000).
2. John M. Shuey, Some Problems of Co-ownership in Louisiana Mineral
Law, in TWELFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 63 (George W. Hardy,
III ed., 1965); Thomas A. Harrell, Problems Created by Coownership in
Louisiana, in THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 379
(Patricia A. Geier ed., 1986); Angela Jeanne Crowder, Comment, Mineral
Rights: The Requirement of Consent Among Co-owners, 48 LA. L. REV. 931
(1988).
3. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 797 (2008).
4. Id. art. 480 (2010).
5. Id. art. 479. For the definition of both a natural person and a juridical
person, see id. art. 24 (1999).
6. Id. art. 462 (2010).
7. “Corporeals are things that have a body, whether animate or inanimate,
and can be felt or touched.” Id. art. 461.
8. “When a person, at his decease, leaves several heirs, each of them
becomes an undivided proprietor of the effects of the succession, for the part or
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(after which, “[e]ach spouse owns an undivided one-half interest in
former community property”9 prior to partition). Co-ownership
might also result from a legal entity’s liquidation or dissolution and
the concomitant distribution of the assets to the former
shareholders,10 partners,11 or members.12
Although “[o]wnership of land does not include ownership of
oil, gas, and other minerals occurring naturally in liquid or gaseous
form, . . . [t]he landowner has the exclusive right to explore and
develop his property for the production of such minerals and to
reduce them to possession and ownership.”13
The right to conduct oil and gas operations on land is typically
created by either a mineral lease14 or a mineral servitude.15 Each of
those mineral rights16 confers the right to operate on the burdened
land.17
Additionally, “[m]ineral rights are susceptible of ownership in
indivision.”18 When co-ownership of a mineral right exists, “use or
possession of a mineral right inures to the benefit of all co-owners
of the right.”19 Indeed, “use of a mineral servitude must be by the

portion coming to him, which forms among the heirs a community of property,
as long as it remains undivided.” Id. art. 1292 (2000).
9. Id. art. 2369.2 (2009).
10. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:141–149 (2010).
11. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2833 (2005).
12. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1337(A).
13. Id. § 31:6 (2000).
14. “A mineral lease is a contract by which the lessee is granted the right to
explore for and produce minerals. A single lease may be created on two or more
noncontiguous tracts of land . . . .” Id. § 31:114.
15. See Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207 (La.
1922); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:21.
16. “The basic mineral rights that may be created by a landowner are the
mineral servitude, the mineral royalty, and the mineral lease.” LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 31:16.
17. While a mineral royalty is also a mineral right that is susceptible of
ownership in indivision, a mineral royalty is a passive interest that confers on its
owner neither an executive right “nor . . . the right to conduct operations to
explore for or produce minerals.” Id. § 31:81. Although a mineral royalty created
by a co-owner of land is beyond the scope of this Article (because it does not
confer the right to operate), it is noted en passant that, pursuant to Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 31:165, a “co-owner of land may create a mineral
royalty out of his undivided interest in the land,” and the “consent of the coowner of the party creating the royalty right is not necessary to entitle the
royalty owner to receive his proportionate part of production.” Id. § 31:165.
18. Id. § 31:168.
19. Id. § 31:174. See Lowry v. MRT Exploration Co., 382 So. 2d 1034,
1036 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (“The drilling activities conducted on the property by
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owner of the servitude, his representative or employee, or some
other person acting on his behalf,”20 with the further instruction
that a “person is acting on behalf of the servitude owner only when
there is a legal relationship between him and the servitude owner,
such as co-ownership or agency.”21
The Civil Code states that “[a] co-owner may freely lease,
alienate, or encumber his share of the thing held in indivision.”22
However, at general law, the “consent of all the co-owners is
required for the lease, alienation, or encumbrance of the entire
thing held in indivision.”23 As article 2 of the Louisiana Mineral
Code recognizes,24 this statement of general law would yield to the
specific provisions of the Louisiana Mineral Code pertaining to coownership of mineral rights or land.
While this Article examines the current state of the law on this
important topic, it is necessary to consider the law of Louisiana
concerning the rights and duties of co-owners generally, as well as
the law pertaining to oil and gas operations, both prior to the
enactment in 1975 of the Louisiana Mineral Code and then as a
result of significant amendments to that Code in 1986 and in 1988.
II. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CO-OWNERS GENERALLY
A. Introduction
Each co-owner has the right to possess and to enjoy the whole
of the thing co-owned, in accordance with its destination (or
consistently with its nature), coextensively with all other coowners.25 As noted by Professor Thomas A. Harrell:
Each coowner has an equal and correlative right to
personally occupy and use all of the property without regard
to the extent of his fractional interest if his activities are

Smackover [the lessee of a co-owner] within ten years from the creation of this
servitude interrupted prescription as to all co-owners.”).
20. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:42.
21. Id. § 31:43.
22. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 805 (2008).
23. Id.
24. “The provisions of this Code are supplementary to those of the
Louisiana Civil Code and are applicable specifically to the subject matter of
mineral law. In the event of conflict between the provisions of this Code and
those of the Civil Code or other laws the provisions of this Code shall prevail. If
this Code does not expressly or impliedly provide for a particular situation, the
Civil Code or other laws are applicable.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:2.
25. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 802.

750

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

consistent with the destination of the property. He cannot be
charged by his coowners for such use. . . . The courts will not
regulate the ordinary use of the property by several
coowners, nor arbitrate disputes among them as to such
matters. The remedy of the coowners is to partition the
property if they cannot agree upon how the property is to be
used.26
While the right of each co-owner of a thing to possession
thereof is equal and coextensive, it is also the long-recognized and
well-settled law in Louisiana that one co-owner in possession of
the thing cannot be evicted from such possession by another coowner.27 Rather, the remedy of the nonpossessory co-owner is in
the nature of an action for partition and–or for accounting of any
rents, fruits, or products that the possessory co-owner derives from
the thing.28
B. Partition Is the Remedy Available to the Unhappy Co-owner
The case of Juneau v. Laborde29 presented the situation
wherein certain co-owners of land sued another co-owner who had
taken possession of the property and cultivated cotton for 14 years.
The plaintiffs sought “to recover the value of rents, revenues, use
and enjoyment.”30 Although the court stated that the defendant
“was never a trespasser but a co-owner of the property with
plaintiffs,”31 he was not liable for rent because, “[as] a co-owner of
the property[,] [he] was entitled, as such, to occupy it without
becoming liable to plaintiffs for rent.”32 The defendant was ordered
to “account to his co-owner for all rents and revenues he has
received because, in obtaining these fruits, he acts not only for
himself but also as the agent of his co-owner for the latter’s just
proportion.”33 The court noted that the “remedy of the co-owner
out of possession is . . . by suit for a partition and settlement of
accounts, or for a division of profits.”34
26. See Harrell, supra note 2, at 386–87 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
27. Spencer v. Spencer, 273 So. 2d 605, 607 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
28. Moreira v. Schwan, 37 So. 542 (La. 1904).
29. 82 So. 2d 693 (La. 1955).
30. Id. at 695.
31. Id. See also Pettus v. Atchafalaya Wildlife Protective Soc’y, 351 So. 2d
790 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (“A lessee who possesses through his lessor is not a
trespasser.”).
32. Juneau, 82 So. 2d at 695.
33. Id. (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 696.
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The defendant in Coon v. Miller35 was the surviving spouse of
a decedent whose estate the plaintiff was administering. The
succession administrator sued the defendant spouse, challenging
her right to continue to use and occupy the family home, which
was a portion of the former community. The plaintiff sought the
eviction of the defendant under a claimed implied lease, as well as
a judgment for unpaid rent.36 The surviving spouse argued that she
occupied the premises under her rights as co-owner, not under any
lease.37
The court held that the defendant, as co-owner, had the right to
possess the property coextensively with any other co-owner and,
further, that as a co-owner in possession, could not be evicted.38
Furthermore, the proper remedy available to the administrator was
an action for partition.39
Interestingly, the court stated the following with respect to the
administrator’s claim that the occupancy of the surviving spouse
should be viewed as that of a lessee who had not paid rent:
If this action should be considered as a proceeding against a
lessee or tenant of property liable for unpaid rent, it would
seem clear that plaintiff would be entitled both to the
remedy of eviction and to possession of the premises, and
that the present suit would be authorized under the
provisions of LSA-C.C.P. Title 11, Article 4701, et seq.,
relating to the ejectment of tenants and occupants.
However, the instant case does not justify the application
and the enforcement of the codal provisions above noted.
The record does not contain evidence of any nature of lease
or agreement of rent between the parties, either express or
implied. Despite the fact that plaintiff is a judgment
creditor for an amount representing unpaid rent, this
judgment in itself is not sufficient to sustain the contention
that defendant’s right of occupancy derives from any
agreement of lease or rental.40
The unique relationship between co-owners is fraught with the
opportunity for passive tension, if not outright aggressive hostility.
Even when the co-owners’ shares are equal, human nature informs
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

175 So. 2d 385 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
See id. at 386.
See id.
Id. at 386–87.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 386.
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us that at least one co-owner always seems to take pleasure in
exercising his or her rights of co-ownership solely for the purpose
of being disagreeable with respect to the desire of another coowner to take a certain action with regard to the commonly held
thing (e.g., land).41
As cogently expressed by the ancient Roman commentators,
the foundational rule was that “one of the co-owners of a thing in
common can do nothing (in re) in or concerning the thing (invito
altero) against the will of, or in opposition to, the other.”42 When
the issue was presented to the Louisiana Supreme Court, this rule
naturally led to the conclusion that a “co-owner may . . . oppose
any attempt by his co-owners, or by a lessee of his co-owner, to
exploit the common property for oil and gas.”43
As a natural consequence of the rule that co-owners of land
“are owners par mi et par tout, of part and of the whole,”44 the
only reasonable remedy available to a disagreeable co-owner is
partition.45 So powerful was this rule that the courts have
characterized the right of a co-owner to demand a partition as
“favored.”46
C. Jurisprudential Treatment of the Right of a Co-owner to Grant
a Mineral Lease on Its Undivided Interest in the Co-owned Land
As will be seen,47 the Louisiana Mineral Code now requires the
consent of a certain threshold of owners before exploration and
production (E&P) operations48 may be conducted on co-owned
land (either pursuant to a mineral servitude or a mineral lease) or
on land burdened by a co-owned mineral servitude. The full effect
and legal import of these codal provisions may be fully appreciated
only if they are considered in light of the law of co-ownership,
41. Perhaps Rodney King was prescient when he asked, “Can’t we all just
get along?”
42. Gulf Refining Co. of La. v. Carroll, 82 So. 277, 278 (La. 1919) (citing
DIG. 10.3.28 (Papinian, Quaestionums 7)).
43. Id.
44. Id. (alteration in original).
45. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 807 (2008).
46. Campbell v. Pasternack Holding Co., Inc., 625 So. 2d 477, 480 (La. 1993)
(stating that “partition is favored under Louisiana law and this Court’s
jurisprudence” and further that the “need to partition stems from the
inconvenience of co-management, namely the requirement of unanimous consent
of co-owners in managing commonly held property”).
47. See discussion infra Part III.
48. E&P operations are physical activities conducted in connection with the
drilling of a well in pursuit of exploration for and production of oil, gas, or other
minerals. But see discussion infra Part XII.
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which historically prevailed in Louisiana prior to the adoption of
the Louisiana Mineral Code in 1975 and before the amendments to
that Code in 1986 and 1988.
Prior to 1986, a mineral lessee was required to obtain the
consent of all co-owners of a co-owned tract of land before it could
operate on the leased premises. This proposition was announced in
the seminal case of Gulf Refining Company of Louisiana v.
Carroll,49 where the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the right of a
recalcitrant co-owner to oppose the conduct of mineral operations
by a lessee of a consenting co-owner.
The plaintiff held a mineral lease granted by the owner of an
undivided one-half interest in a tract of land.50 The other co-owner
did not consent to the lease.51 The lessee sought to establish its
“right, supposedly derived from the lease in question, to go upon
the land in question to exploit it for oil and gas.”52 The court stated
as follows:
Now the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land has not
the right to exploit the land for oil and gas without the
consent, implied or express, of his co-owner, and not having
this right himself he cannot confer it upon a lessee; and the
plaintiff company has not alleged that it has the consent,
implied or express, of [the other co-owner] for going upon
this land to exploit it for oil and gas. . . .
A co-owner may therefore oppose any attempt by his coowners, or by a lessee of his co-owner, to exploit the
common property for oil and gas. . . .
From this source53 has been derived the maxims, “In re
communi melior est conditio prohibentis”—a maxim
meaning, “In common property the condition of the one
prohibiting is the better,”—and “In re communi neminem
dominorum jure facere quicquam, invito altero, posse,” a
maxim meaning “One coproprietor can exercise no authority
over the common property against the will of the other.” Or
as the same maxim is more tersely expressed “Melior est
prohibentis.” In other words, either coowner has a right of
veto against the acts of the other. And it is that very legal
situation which underlies the principle that no one can be
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See Carroll, 82 So. 277.
Id. at 278.
Id.
Id.
The court is referring to Sabinus, who is quoted previously in the case.
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compelled to remain in indivision; that any co-owner may
at any time demand a partition. . . .
By all this is not meant that the lease is not valid as
between the lessor and the lessee, nor that one may not
validly lease property belonging to another, but what is
meant is that such a lease is null in so far as the co-owner is
concerned; on the same principle that the lease of the
property of another, while valid as between the parties to
the lease, is null in so far as this other is concerned. The
idea is simply that neither one of the co-owners has any
right to any particular part of the common estate, or to do
anything upon it, to the exclusion of his coowner.54
The court in Carroll cited Gulf Refining Company of Louisiana
v. Hayne.55 In that case, and as explained in subsequent litigation
between those parties,56 Hayne granted a mineral lease to Gulf
Refining Company (Gulf). After examining title, Gulf determined
that Hayne only owned an undivided one-third interest in the
land.57 Gulf called upon its lessor to rectify the situation by having
the co-owners ratify the lease.58 Upon Hayne’s failure to do so,
Gulf sued “for a partition of the land in order that his interest in it
might be segregated and the rights conferred by the lease exercised
upon that interest.”59 The suit failed because a mineral lessee had
no standing to demand a partition of the land leased.60
Judicial proceedings taken in the Hayne case after the denial of
the right of partition are also instructive.61 Subsequent to the first
opinion, Gulf went onto the property to operate and was met with

54. Carroll, 82 So. at 278–80.
55. 70 So. 509 (La. 1916).
56. Gulf Refining Co. of La. v. Hayne, 86 So. 891 (La. 1920).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 891–92.
60. Id. at 892 (citing Hayne, 70 So. 509). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
31:169 (2000) (“Co-ownership does not exist between the owner of a mineral
right and the owner of the land subject to the right or between the owners of
separate mineral rights.”). But see Lacassane Co., Inc. v. Jardin Minerals Co.,
847 So. 2d 704, 705 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that an owner of a distinct
mineral servitude granted by fewer than all co-owners could force a partition
with the owner of a different, discrete mineral servitude granted by fewer than
all of the co-owners because they commonly held “the right to explore for,
develop and reduce to possession” the minerals under the co-owned land).
61. Hayne, 86 So. 891.
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an injunction by the nonsignatory co-owners.62 The injunction
issued and was still in force.63
Under the mineral lease from Hayne, “operations had to begin
within 12 months” from its date.64 After that period elapsed, Hayne
and his co-owners drilled a well that was successful.65 Gulf sued
for its net revenue share of the product, contending that
the delay for beginning operations could not run while the
plaintiff company was prevented by the injunction from
acting; and that consequently the lease has continued in full
force; that it has divested Hayne of all right he had to the
oil under the land, and of all right he had to operate for
same, and has vested these rights fully and completely in
plaintiff; and that therefore plaintiff is entitled to have the
oil produced by said well, and to stand in the place of
Hayne with reference to said well.66
Hayne defended by saying that he was not a party to the
injunction suit and that “it was by no act of his that the plaintiff
company was prevented from operating.”67 The court stated that
this argument would be sound “if the defendant Hayne had not
been under obligation by his contract of lease to cause plaintiff
company to have possession of the land, and the want of this
possession had not been the sole reason of the plaintiff company’s
not operating.”68
Finding the defendant lessor to be “at fault,” the court then
stated that “to allow him to take advantage of the expiration of the
delay in question would be to allow him to take advantage of his
own fault.”69 Thus, the court found that Gulf was entitled to its net
revenue share of production under its lease with Hayne.70
The second Hayne decision says a great deal about the
character of a mineral lease granted by less than all of the coowners, as well as the lessor’s obligation to deliver the leased
premises to the lessee.71 While the lessee under such a lease could
62. Id. at 892.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 892–93.
71. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:119 (2000) (“A mineral lessor is bound to
deliver the premises that he has leased for use by the lessee, to refrain from
disturbing the lessee’s possession, and to perform the contract in good faith.”).
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not––prior to 1986––operate without the consent of all other coowners, it is otherwise a valid lease entitling its owner to its
stipulated share of revenue when brought about by the efforts of
others.
The issue was next visited in United Gas Public Service
Company v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Company.72 In that case,
the defendant acquired an oil and gas lease from F. E. Gloyd and
began drilling operations.73 Subsequently, the plaintiff acquired a
7/40 interest in the same property and filed suit to enjoin the
defendant from continuing the drilling operations.74 The trial court
refused to issue the injunction, and the plaintiff appealed.75
On original hearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court relied on the
Louisiana jurisprudence and civil law doctrine that without the
other co-owner’s consent, a co-owner may “oppose any attempt by
his co-owner, or by lessee of his co-owner, to exploit the common
property for oil or gas (or other minerals), a doctrine ‘as old as the
Roman Law.’”76 Thus, the court held that an injunction was the
proper remedy in that case and the defendant’s course of action
was to institute a partition proceeding.77
On rehearing, the court found that granting an injunction might
cause irreparable damage to the defendant and, at the same time,
prevent the use of the property for gas-drilling operations.78
Carroll was distinguished on the stated basis that it was not shown
“that the land involved was proven oil or gas land nor that it was
being drained and destroyed by adjacent wells,” and, further, that
“the titles of the landowners” were disputed.79
72. 147 So. 66 (La. 1933).
73. Id. at 68 (on rehearing).
74. Id. at 67 (on original hearing).
75. Id.
76. Id. The court noted this position to be contrary to the common law
doctrine that would have permitted a cotenant to conduct drilling operations
without obtaining the consent of the other cotenants. Id. (citing LAWRENCE MILLS
& J. C. WILLINGHAM, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 177, at 265 (1926)). See, e.g.,
Byrom v. Pendley, 717 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. 1986) (“It has long been the rule in
Texas that a cotenant has the right to extract minerals from common property
without first obtaining the consent of his cotenants; however, he must account to
them on the basis of the value of any minerals taken, less the necessary and
reasonable costs of production and marketing. The rule announced in Burnham
and reaffirmed in Cox is founded on the distinctive legal relationship existing
between cotenants; that is, each cotenant has a right to enter upon the common
estate and a corollary right to possession.” (citing Cox v. Davison, 397 S.W.2d
200, 201 (Tex. 1965); Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330, 334–35 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1912), aff’d on other grounds, 195 S.W. 1139 (Tex. 1917))).
77. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 147 So. at 67.
78. Id. at 69 (on rehearing).
79. Id.
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The court observed that, as a co-owner, the plaintiff would not
be damaged by defendant’s drilling operations if no gas were
found.80 On the other hand, if gas were found, the plaintiff would
be compensated financially for the value of the gas.81
Consequently, the court held that a co-owner could not prevent
drilling operations on property owned in indivision and refused to
issue the injunction.82 The co-owner could recover any damages
from the drilling operations by receiving his share of the revenues
from gas produced on the property.83
Professor Harriet Spiller Daggett, in her significant work on
mineral rights, lamented that the supreme court, on rehearing in
this case, was seemingly “influenced . . . to some extent” by “the
line of common-law authorities” cited in the original opinion.84
Professor Daggett stated further that the “evidence inclines toward
a just decision, but the violence to the flat doctrine must be
observed for future need as it makes the question a factual one.”85
In Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. Murphy,86 the plaintiff
sought to cancel two mineral leases granted by some, but not all, of
the co-owners of a tract of land.87 The plaintiff argued that a
partition sale of the property had extinguished the leases.88 The
lessee contended that the partition sale was null and void because it
failed to comply with Act No. 336 of 1940 (the Act).89 The Act
required both that he be made a party to the sale and that his lease
be separately appraised.90 The evidence showed that although the
partition judgment was rendered prior to the effective date of the
Act, the writ ordering the sale, the advertisement of the sale, and
the sale itself all occurred subsequent to the passage of the Act.91
The court held that because the Act did not contain any
declaration that it was to have retroactive effect and because the
act created substantive rights and did not deal with matters of
procedure, the partition sale was valid even though it failed to
comport with the Act.92 Because the partition sale was valid, the
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
(1939).
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
HARRIET SPILLER DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA § 46, at 153
Id.
16 So. 2d 244 (La. 1943).
Id. at 244.
Id.
Id. at 245.
See id.
Id. at 245–46.
Id. at 246.
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court ordered that the inscription of the lease should be cancelled
and erased from the public records.93
The Louisiana Supreme Court provided further commentary on
the nature of the relationship between co-owners in a case
challenging a statute that authorized the State Mineral Board to
grant a mineral lease on lands owned by a large number of coowners. Prior to their repeal in 1960,94 Louisiana Revised Statutes
sections 30:181–185 provided a procedure whereby the State
Mineral Board95 could be requested to grant a mineral lease on
land “owned in indivision by five hundred or more persons.” The
constitutionality of Act No. 513 of 1952 (codified as Louisiana
Revised Statutes sections 30:181–188) was challenged in Sun Oil
Company v. State Mineral Board.96
One of the co-owners, Belle Isle Corporation,97 granted a
mineral lease on its lands to Sun Oil Company.98 After the lease
was granted, a group of co-owners applied to the State Mineral
Board pursuant to the statute, seeking to have a lease granted on
behalf of the land’s co-owners.99 Both the lessor and the lessee
under the first mineral lease brought this suit, “charg[ing] that such
leasing by the Board would be violative of various provisions of
the Federal and Louisiana Constitutions, including the due process
and equal protection clauses and the prohibitions against ex post
facto laws and laws impairing the obligation of contracts.”100
The trial court held that the Act was unconstitutional, but the
supreme court reversed, upholding its constitutionality.101 In its
original decision, the court cited the Amerada decision for the
proposition that a lease granted by less than all of the co-owners
“is null insofar as the other co-owners are concerned” and noted
that “a co-owner may oppose any attempt by his co-owners, or by
a lessee of his co-owners, to exploit the common property for oil
and gas.”102
93. See id. at 245, 246.
94. Act No. 358, 1960 La. Acts 739. Inexplicably, the repealing legislation
did not repeal Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 30:186–188.
95. Now called the State Mineral and Energy Board. See Act No. 196, 2009
La. Acts 1981.
96. 92 So. 2d 583 (La. 1956).
97. Stated in the opinion to be the “[o]wner of an undivided 13/144 plus an
undivided 423/864 of an .045798 interest in the land.” Id. at 586.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 584–85.
100. Id. at 585.
101. Id. at 585, 588–89.
102. Id. at 586 (footnote omitted) (citing Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Reese,
196 So. 558 (La. 1940); Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Murphy, 16 So. 2d 244 (La.
1943)).
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The court then cited Carroll for the proposition that “as between
the parties, the lease of mineral interests owned in indivision with
others is valid since one may validly lease property belonging to
another.”103 The court then noted:
However, it is well established in the cited cases and in the
many authorities following them that such a lease is null
insofar as the other co-owners are concerned and a coowner may oppose any attempt by his co-owners, or by a
lessee of his co-owners, to exploit the common property for
oil and gas, the theory being that co-owners are owners par
mi et par tout, of part and of the whole, and no co-owner
has the exclusive right to any determinate part of the
common property.104
Commenting further on such a mineral lease, the court stated:
The most accurate description of co-plaintiffs’ lease is that
it was an executory contract dependent for its operation
upon a suspensive condition, viz., that Sun Oil Company,
as lessee, obtain leases or at least acquiescence from every
other co-owner of the land in question. Neither the leases
nor the consent have ever been procured and it is clear that
no obligation has ever come into being.105
Rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the statute “operates as a
divestiture of vested rights,” the court stated:
The lease in question vests no rights in either party since it
confers neither rights nor obligations until the happening of
the suspensive condition previously discussed for, as above
stated, prior to this time Belle Isle Corporation could not
deliver possession of the premises and Sun Oil Company is
precluded from going on the land to explore for minerals.106
It is one thing to say that the lessee under a mineral lease granted
by less than all co-owners of land has no right to operate on the
described lands without the consent of all other co-owners.
However, to say that such a lease (irrespective of the issue of the
right to operate) is of no force or effect—that it “vests no rights in
either party since it confers neither rights nor obligations until the
103. Id. (citations omitted) (citing Gulf Refining Co. of La. v. Carroll, 82 So.
277 (La. 1919)).
104. Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
105. Id. at 586–87 (footnote omitted).
106. Id. at 587 (citing Gulf Refining Co. of La. v. Carroll, 82 So. 277 (La.
1919)).
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happening of the suspensive condition previously discussed”—
overstates the proposition a bit.107
Application was made for a rehearing, which was disposed of, as
follows:
In briefs filed on application for rehearing issue was taken
to certain statements in our opinion in this case concerning
vested rights, impairment of the obligation of contracts, and
the validity of the lease between Belle Isle and Sun Oil.
Upon further consideration we have decided that a
discussion of these issues is unnecessary to a decision in this
case, and we now prefer to rest our decision solely on the
basis that Act 513 of 1952 is constitutional because it is a
valid exercise by the state of its police power.108
Contrary to the statement that was withdrawn on rehearing, the
proposition was more accurately stated in Acree v. Shell Oil
Company:
A mineral lease from a co-owner does not create a mere
personal obligation in the “lessor” to deliver an interest in
land should the lessor ever acquire title to it. Such a lease
confers a valid mineral right. The exercise of the right is
merely suspended pending the consent of the other coowners.109
A consequence of a mineral lease granted by less than all coowners not being per se invalid is that “it may not be stricken from
the public records.”110 While the fact that such a mineral lease
“may not be stricken from the public records” certainly says
something about its legal character or efficacy, still, the mere
recordation of an instrument does not give it any effect that cannot
be ascribed to it by general law. Thus, as it is stated in current law,
the “recordation of an instrument . . . [d]oes not create a
presumption that the instrument is valid or genuine.”111

107. Id. (emphasis added). See also infra Part XIII.
108. Sun Oil Co., 92 So. 2d at 588–89 (per curiam) (denying application for
rehearing).
109. 548 F. Supp. 1150, 1156 (M.D. La. 1982) (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
31:166 (2000); id. § 31:166 cmt.), aff’d, 721 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1984).
110. Ree Corp. v. Shaffer, 246 So. 2d 313, 322 (La. Ct. App. 1971), aff’d,
260 So. 2d 307 (La. 1972).
111. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3341(1) (2007).
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D. Jurisprudential Treatment of the Right of a Co-owner to Grant
a Mineral Servitude on Its Undivided Interest in the Co-owned
Land
An early case involved the purchase of a mineral servitude
interest from a co-owner of the land.112 The servitude owner
contended that the right of the other co-owners to withhold their
consent, thereby prohibiting any drilling by the mineral purchaser,
constituted an obstacle, which suspended the prescription running
against the purchaser’s mineral servitude.113
The court held that such right of the other co-owners of the
land was not sufficient to constitute an obstacle114 within the
meaning of article 792 of the Louisiana Civil Code115 because the
mineral purchaser could remove the obstacle by suing for a
partition of the land under article 740,116 in which case his mineral
interest would attach to the portion of the land assigned to his
vendor.117 The court stated that the obstacle doctrine applies “to
those obstacles only which the owner of the servitude or real right
has not consented to.”118
III. ENTER THE LOUISIANA MINERAL CODE
A. Preface
Without regard to the opportunity for abuse, the law prior to
1986 was clear: The owner of a minute, undivided interest in a
tract of land could, absent his or her consent, object and thereby
prevent E&P operations. This absolute right of recalcitrance
existed despite the fact that the balance––or even the vast
majority––of the remaining co-owners desired that such operations
be conducted.
112. Hightower v. Maritzky, 195 So. 518 (La. 1940).
113. Id. at 520–21.
114. See id.
115. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 755 (2008) (“If the owner of the dominant
estate is prevented from using the servitude by an obstacle that he can neither
prevent nor remove, the prescription of nonuse is suspended on that account for
a period of up to ten years.”).
116. See id. art. 717 (“If the estate owned in indivision is partitioned in kind,
the servitude established by a co-owner on his undivided part burdens only the
part allotted to him.”).
117. This would no longer be good law because the “[o]wner of a mineral
right acquired from a co-owner of land cannot compel partition of the land.” LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:167 (2000).
118. Hightower, 195 So. at 520.
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As a practical matter, this circumstance––this opportunity for
recalcitrance––resulted in the nonconsenting co-owner enjoying
greater “bargaining power” to secure from the lessee (or other
party desiring to operate) better terms or a higher bonus, rental, or
royalty than his co-owners who had already leased. In the mind of
the lessee, the term highway robbery or extortion came to mind.
If that last consenting co-owner should have received better
terms, the other previously committed co-owners, who rightfully
felt that they were being penalized for leasing earlier, might
understandably be dissatisfied. The “holdout” might be said to
have been rewarded for his recalcitrance while the earlier signing
lessors felt that they were being disadvantaged for having been
cooperative with the lessee and receiving lesser terms. Suffice it to
say, this did not lead to happy family reunions—“All in the
Family,” indeed.119
As originally adopted in 1975,120 the Louisiana Mineral Code
was totally consistent with then-prevailing law pertinent to coowners. At that time, the consent of all co-owners was necessary
for one co-owner (or the lessee of a co-owner) to operate on the
co-owned land or co-owned mineral servitude.
Because it meant that the single owner of a very small,
undivided interest in the land could prevent operations, which the
vast majority of the co-owners desired, this high level of consent
proved untenable.121 The Louisiana Legislature undertook to
rectify this situation, first in 1986, then in 1988.
As will be seen, three articles of the Louisiana Mineral Code
come into play in considering these issues. They address the
following aspects of co-ownership, to-wit:
(a) Article 164 regulates the creation of a mineral servitude by
a co-owner of land;
(b) Article 166 addresses the granting of a mineral lease by a
co-owner of land; and
(c) Article 175 concerns the rights of co-owners of a mineral
servitude to operate on the land.
119. A lessor who leases early might protect itself by insisting upon a “most
favored nations” clause under which the lessee is obligated to extend or pay to
those lessors who signed earlier at lesser terms or considerations, the greater or
better terms or considerations if paid by the lessee to a lessor who subsequently
signs a mineral lease. Courts have enforced clauses of this type, resulting in
significant damage awards. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Petrohawk Props., L.P., 37
So. 3d 1145 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (awarding $1,920,000); Hoover Tree Farm,
L.L.C. v. Goodrich Petroleum Co., L.L.C., 63 So. 3d 159 (La. Ct. App. 2011)
(awarding $7.6 million), cert. denied, 69 So. 3d 1161–62 (La. 2011).
120. Act. No. 50, 1974 La. Acts 237 (effective January 1, 1975).
121. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:164 cmt.
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These three articles are examined in Parts IV, V, and VI hereof,
respectively.
B. Amendments in 1986
With the foregoing historical perspective in mind, in 1986, the
Louisiana Legislature amended several of the co-ownership articles
of the Louisiana Mineral Code. These included articles 164, 166,
and 175.122
As amended at that time, the relevant articles permitted the
conduct of E&P operations by the party desiring to operate who
obtained the consent from less than all of the co-owners, provided
that at least 90% of the co-owners had expressed their consent to
such operations. In this manner, a minority of co-owners owning,
in the aggregate, less than a 10% interest in the land or servitude
could not frustrate the will of the great majority.
This amendment’s rationale was explained in the Comment to
the 1986 Amendment under article 164 of the Louisiana Mineral
Code, as follows:
The 1986 amendments to Articles [sic] 164, 166, and 175
continue to preserve the principle in the Mineral Code that
one co-owner may not conduct operations without the consent
of his co-owner, but limit this principle so that a small
minority of co-owners cannot prevent mineral operations
desired by other owners of rights in the land or mineral
rights. . . .
These amendments are intended to be read broadly in favor
of allowing the majority of owners to develop where they so
desire. Thus the ninety percent is to be calculated such that it
includes the interest of the owner seeking to gain the consent
of the others.123
C. Amendments in 1988
In 1988, the 90% threshold introduced in 1986 was lowered to
80%.124 These amendments—as the commentary noted above
explains—clearly and unambiguously evince the Louisiana
Legislature’s intent to permit the conduct of oil and gas operations
by an operator to whom not less than 80% of the co-owners (of co122. Act No. 1047, 1986 La. Acts 1964.
123. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:164 cmt. (emphasis added).
124. Act No. 647, 1988 La. Acts 1686.
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owned land or of a co-owned mineral servitude, as the case may be)
have granted consent.
IV. CREATION OF A MINERAL SERVITUDE BY A CO-OWNER OF LAND
A. Article 164, Louisiana Mineral Code
Article 164 addresses the creation of a mineral servitude by a
co-owner of land. It reads as follows:
A co-owner of land may create a mineral servitude out of
his undivided interest in the land, and prescription
commences from the date of its creation. One who acquires
a mineral servitude from a co-owner of land may not
exercise his right without the consent of co-owners owning
at least an undivided eighty percent interest in the land,
provided that he has made every effort to contact such coowners and, if contacted, has offered to contract with them
on substantially the same basis that he has contracted with
another co-owner. A co-owner of the land who does not
consent to the exercise of such rights has no liability for the
costs of development and operations, except out of his
share of production.125
B. How It Works
Although a mineral servitude indisputably confers upon its
owner the right to operate on the land,126 one who acquires a
mineral servitude from a co-owner of land may not exercise such
right without the consent of co-owners of the land owning at least
an undivided 80% interest in the land. Inasmuch as a co-owner of
land must obtain the requisite consent of its co-owners, a person
whose rights arise under a co-owner—such as a mineral servitude
owner or a mineral lessee—may not operate on the land until that
level of consent is obtained.127
Rather, the party desiring to operate must demonstrate that he
has made every effort to contact such yet-to-have-consented co125. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:164.
126. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:21.
127. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207, 245 (La.
1922) (“[N]o one can convey to another any greater right than he himself has.”);
Herlitz Constr. Co., Inc. v. Matherne, 476 So. 2d 1037 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (“An
assignee acquires no greater rights than its assignor.”); Town of Homer v.
United Healthcare of La., Inc., 948 So. 2d 1163, 1169 (La. Ct. App. 2007); (“An
assignor cannot assign any rights greater than that which he held.”).

2013]

OIL IN THE FAMILY

765

owners and, if contacted, has offered to contract with them on
substantially the same basis that he has contracted with another coowner.128
A co-owner of the land who does not consent to the exercise of
such rights has no liability for the costs of development and
operations, except out of his share of production.129
V. GRANTING OF A MINERAL LEASE BY A CO-OWNER OF LAND
A. Article 166, Louisiana Mineral Code
Similar to article 164, article 166 concerns the granting of a
mineral lease by a co-owner of land. That article provides as
follows:
A co-owner of land may grant a valid mineral lease . . . as
to his undivided interest in the land but the lessee . . . may
not exercise his rights thereunder without consent of coowners owning at least an undivided eighty percent interest
in the land, provided that he has made every effort to
contact such co-owners and, if contacted, has offered to
contract with them on substantially the same basis that he
has contracted with another co-owner. A co-owner of the
land who does not consent to the exercise of such rights has
no liability for the costs of development and operations or
other costs, except out of his share of production.130
B. How It Works
This article works in the same manner as the prior article, but it
is directed to a mineral lease granted by less than all of the coowners of the land. As in the situation regulated by article 164, the
lessee desiring to conduct E&P activities on the co-owned land
must first obtain the “consent of co-owners owning at least an
undivided eighty percent interest in the land” and must satisfy the
requirements of the proviso. More about that later.131
128. This feature of the rule pertaining to a nonconsenting co-owner is
discussed infra in Part X.
129. This aspect of the rule pertaining to a nonconsenting co-owner is more
fully developed infra in Part XI.
130. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:166. The omitted text is discussed infra in
Part XII. That Part considers the granting of consent to conduct seismic or
geophysical activities, which differ from traditional E&P operations.
131. This feature of the rule pertaining to a nonconsenting co-owner is
discussed infra in Part X.
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VI. RIGHTS OF CO-OWNERS OF A MINERAL SERVITUDE TO OPERATE
ON THE LAND
A. Article 175, Louisiana Mineral Code
The rights of co-owners of a mineral servitude to operate on
the land are regulated by article 175, which reads:
A co-owner of a mineral servitude may not conduct
operations on the property subject to the servitude without
the consent of co-owners owning at least an undivided
eighty percent interest in the servitude, provided that he has
made every effort to contact such co-owners and, if
contacted, has offered to contract with them on substantially
the same basis that he has contracted with another co-owner
. . . . A co-owner of the servitude who does not consent to
such operations has no liability for the costs of development
and operations except out of his share of production.132
B. How It Works
As with the two articles previously considered, and except as
hereinafter provided, no E&P operations may be conducted on land
burdened by a distinct mineral servitude that is owned in indivision
unless the requisite level of consent is obtained. There is an
important difference, however, in the manner in which the level of
consent is calculated.133
C. A Limited Exception to the Need for a Requisite Level of
Consent
Article 176 of the Louisiana Mineral Code provides an
exception to the requirement of article 175 that the requisite level
of consent be obtained before E&P operations can be conducted
under a co-owned mineral servitude. That article reads as follows:
A co-owner of a mineral servitude may act to prevent waste
or the destruction or extinction of the servitude, but he cannot impose upon his co-owner liability for any costs of
development or operation or other costs except out of
production. He may lease or otherwise contract regarding
132. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:175. The omitted text is discussed infra in
Part XII. That Part considers the granting of consent to conduct seismic or
geophysical activities, which differ from traditional E&P operations.
133. See infra Part IX.
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the full ownership of the servitude but must act at all times
in good faith and as a reasonably prudent mineral servitude
owner whose interest is not subject to co-ownership.134
The language in this article “act to prevent waste” refers to the
possibility that drainage is occurring by reason of the presence of a
“lease basis” well on an adjacent or nearby tract of land, whereby a
neighbor exercises its right under the “rule of capture,”135 which is
draining minerals from under the servitude tract.
The language “destruction or extinction of the servitude”
alludes to the potential loss of the mineral servitude by the accrual
of the prescription of nonuse.136 What is not clear is how a court
would view the earliest date prior to the accrual of prescription that
would, in the absence of operations, give rise to the possible
“destruction or extinction of the servitude” such that a co-owner of
the servitude may take action to preserve the servitude. A lessee
under a mineral lease granted pursuant to this article would be
vitally interested in knowing that the lease has not been granted too
soon.
Although the article does not explicitly so state, seemingly,
these exceptions are only necessary in the absence of compulsory
unitization affecting or including the servitude tract or a portion
thereof. To the extent that a compulsory unit includes all or a
portion of the servitude tract, there is no “waste” because there is
no drainage of the servitude as such tract would participate in unit
production.137 By the same token, unit operations or production

134. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:176.
135. The “rule of capture” is codified by three articles of the Louisiana
Mineral Code. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:6 (“The landowner has the
exclusive right to explore and develop his property for the production of such
minerals and to reduce them to possession and ownership.”); id. § 31:8 (“A
landowner . . . may reduce to possession and ownership all of the minerals
occurring naturally in a liquid or gaseous state that can be obtained by
operations on or beneath his land even though his operations may cause their
migration from beneath the land of another.”); id. § 31:14 (“A landowner has no
right against another who causes drainage of liquid or gaseous minerals from
beneath his property if the drainage results from drilling or mining operations on
other lands.”).
136. “A mineral servitude is extinguished by . . . prescription resulting from
nonuse for ten years.” Id. § 31:27(1).
137. “A drilling unit, as contemplated herein, means the maximum area which
may be efficiently and economically drained by one well. This unit shall constitute
a developed area as long as a well is located thereon which is capable of producing
oil or gas in paying quantities.” Id. § 30:9(B) (2007).
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would maintain the mineral servitude in force and effect to the
extent that the servitude tract is in the unit.138
In those instances when the law dispenses with the need to
obtain the requisite level of consent to prevent “waste” or to avoid
the “destruction or extinction of the servitude,” the co-owner
desiring to operate has the power to bind the nonacting co-owners
to a mineral lease that the acting party chooses to grant, and such
lease would validly cover “the full ownership of the servitude.”
The instruction that the co-owner desiring to operate “must act at
all times in good faith and as a reasonably prudent mineral
servitude owner whose interest is not subject to co-ownership” is
concordant with the similar principle as in a mineral lease granted
by the owner of an executive interest.139
Although the Louisiana Mineral Code fails to explain the rights
of a nonacting co-owner who is dissatisfied with the lease’s terms, a
court would apply by analogy the standards of articles 109 and
110140 of the Louisiana Mineral Code as the most logical controlling
principles. The rule announced by the latter article is of great
importance to the lessee who is willing to incur the significant costs
to drill the well. A violation of the standard of conduct, while giving
rise to a personal action by the nonconsenting co-owner against the
acting co-owner, would not invalidate the mineral lease.
Also unanswered is the treatment to be given to a mineral lease
granted to a different lessee by one or more co-owners after another
co-owner has granted a mineral lease, pursuant to this article, which
purports to cover and affect “the full ownership of the servitude.”
Does the “first come, first served” rule operate to deny effect to that
second lease? Does that subsequent lease essentially become a top
138. “It is now well established in the jurisprudence of this court that where
there is a forced unitization, on order of the Commissioner of Conservation,
commercial production from any part of the unit interrupts the running of
prescription as to all mineral servitudes within the unit.” White v. Frank B. Treat
& Son, Inc., 89 So. 2d 883, 884 (La. 1956). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
31:47 (“When drilling or mining operations or actual production otherwise
sufficient to interrupt prescription takes place on a compulsory unit including all
or a part of the land burdened by a mineral servitude, an interruption of
prescription takes place without formal adoption by the owner of the
servitude.”).
139. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:109 (“The owner of an executive interest is
not obligated to grant a mineral lease, but in doing so, he must act in good faith
and in the same manner as a reasonably prudent landowner or mineral servitude
owner whose interest is not burdened by a nonexecutive interest.”).
140. Id. § 31:110 (“A mineral lease granted in violation of the standard of
conduct required by Article 109 is not invalid for that reason, but the owner of a
nonexecutive interest may recover any damages sustained by him by a personal
action against the owner of the executive right. The action prescribes one year
from the date on which the lease is filed for registry.”).
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lease141 vis-à-vis the mineral lease granted pursuant to article 175, at
least with respect to the interest of the lessor signatory to such lease?
While not explicitly so stated, the placement of this limited
exception immediately following article 175—coupled with the
fact that logic would not compel a different conclusion—indicates
that the limited exception is not available to one whose servitude is
addressed by article 164.
D. Scenario Within a Scenario
The mineral servitude, which is treated by article 175 (by
reason of the fact that it is a discrete, co-owned mineral servitude),
might also be subject to article 164 if all co-owners of the land did
not create it in the first instance.
Consequently, if a co-owner of the land created the mineral
servitude in question, article 164 necessarily applies and requires
the “consent of co-owners owning at least an undivided eighty
percent interest in the land” so that operations might be conducted
on the land.142
Even having obtained the “consent of co-owners owning at
least an undivided eighty percent interest in the land,” if that
discrete mineral servitude is itself co-owned, or owned in
indivision, article 175 also applies and requires the “consent of coowners owning at least an undivided eighty percent interest in the
servitude” so that operations might be conducted on the land.143
Thus, under these unique circumstances, two levels of consent
must be obtained from two different categories of persons to
operate on a co-owned servitude obtained from a co-owner of land.
E. Jurisprudential Treatment of the Co-owned Servitudes Created
by Partition
It is not uncommon for co-owners to partition their land and
reserve a mineral servitude on the partitioned land. In those cases,
absent a clear stipulation to the contrary,144 the mineral servitude is
141. A top lease is a lease to take effect upon the expiration of an existing
lease. See Scoggin v. Bagley, 368 So. 2d 763, 766 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
142. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:164.
143. Id.; id. § 31:175.
144. A threshold question in a partition wherein a mineral servitude is reserved
is whether the parties intended to create one mineral servitude over the entire tract
or as many mineral servitudes as there are partitioned tracts. See, e.g., Whitehall
Oil Co. v. Heard, 197 So. 2d 672, 676 (La. Ct. App. 1967) (“Did [the parties to the
partition] intend each tract transferred to be subject to separate mineral royalty
reservations which affected that tract alone? Or did they instead intend for each
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owned in indivision in the same proportions that the land had been
held prior to the partition.
Such was the case in GMB Gas Corporation v. Cox145 in which
on July 1, 1968, certain co-owners of a tract of land entered into a
partition, which provided that “the parties shall continue to remain
as owners in indivision with respect to the oil, gas and other
minerals in, on and under the property herein partitioned.”146 Prior
to this partition, a previous operator drilled ten wells on the coowned lands, and these wellbores remained on the premises.147
Subsequent to the partition, on May 23, 1972, one group of the
co-owners (the Sanders) of the minerals granted a mineral lease to
GMB Gas Corporation.148 The other co-owner (Cox) was not a
party to the mineral lease and refused to permit the lessee to
conduct exploratory operations on the part of the lands that he
received in the partition.149
The Sanders’ lessee sought an injunction to prevent
interference.150 Cox, the recalcitrant co-owner, reconvened for a
judgment declaring the lease invalid and sought an injunction
forbidding the lessee from conducting any operations on any part of
the servitude tract in which he was a co-owner of the mineral
servitude.151
The court stated that the issue was “whether the lessee of a coowner of a mineral servitude created prior to the enactment of the
Mineral Code may conduct operations on lands subject to the
servitude without the consent of the other co-owner.”152 The court
held that the Louisiana Mineral Code was applicable to “pre-code
issues which have not been clearly resolved by the
jurisprudence.”153Applying articles 66 and 67, the court concluded
that the parties “intended to own the minerals under the entire
[servitude] tract in indivision and to create a single mineral servitude
for this purpose.”154

coheir to have a single undivided mineral interest affecting the entire mass of the
property partitioned by the agreements?”).
145. 340 So. 2d 638 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
146. Id. at 639.
147. Cox v. Sanders, 421 So. 2d 869, 871 (La. 1982).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. GMB Gas Corp. v. Cox, 340 So. 2d 638, 640 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
153. Id.
154. Id.
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The court observed that under article 175,155 a “co-owner of a
mineral servitude may not conduct operations on the property
subject to the servitude without the consent of the other coowner.”156 Based on this article, the appellate court remanded for the
entry of an injunction in favor of the recalcitrant, nonconsenting coowner and against the lessee.157
In a subsequent suit, Mrs. Cox sued to have the Sanders’ mineral
servitude terminated.158 The court observed that it
is important to note that in this suit [Mrs. Cox] is asserting
her rights as a land owner against the owner of an
undivided interest in a mineral servitude, and thus she is
asserting rights on a different basis than those which she
asserted in the prior case, . . . wherein she was asserting her
rights as the co-owner of an undivided mineral servitude.159
The court first considered the issue of whether the Louisiana
Mineral Code could be applied to the controversy because the
mineral servitude was created in 1968.160 The supreme court noted
that the court of appeal had applied the Louisiana Mineral Code
but stated that “the controlling law is the pre-codal law applicable
to the rights existing between land owner and mineral interest
owner, and not between two mineral interest owners.”161
The court found that the rule of Clark v. Tensas Delta Land
Company162 and Starr Davis Oil Company, Inc. v. Webber163 was
applicable.164 The court then concluded that “the Sanders were
given the right by the landowner to explore and drill upon the
partitioned lands and that the production obtained by the Sanders’
lessee was sufficient to interrupt prescription of Sanders mineral
servitude for non-use.”165 The court further held that “the
interruption of prescription applied not only to the tract owned by
Sanders upon which production was had but also upon the
contiguous tracts owned by Cox.”166
155. Decided in 1976, GMB Gas Corporation involved the original version
of Article 175, prior to its amendments in 1986 and 1988.
156. GMB Gas Corp., 340 So. 2d at 640.
157. Id. at 641.
158. Cox v. Sanders, 421 So. 2d 869, 870 (La. 1982).
159. Id. at 871.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 872.
162. 136 So. 1 (La. 1931).
163. 48 So. 2d 906 (La. 1950).
164. Cox, 421 So. 2d at 872.
165. Id. at 873.
166. Id.
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VII. RIGHTS OF CO-OWNERS OF LAND TO OPERATE ON THE LAND,
INDEPENDENT OF A MINERAL RIGHT
There is no article in the Louisiana Mineral Code that addresses
the right of a co-owner of land to operate in its own right on the coowned property in the absence of a mineral right regulated by
articles 164, 166, or 175. This is understandable because the Mineral
Code regulates “mineral rights,” and the conduct of drilling
activities by a landowner in no manner involves a mineral right.167
Rather, it is the availment of a landowner’s inherent right in his
ownership of the land.168 This was recognized in one case in the
following observation:
The doctrine that the owner of land has no property right in
the oil or gas beneath the surface, until he has reduced it to
possession, in no manner denies to such owner the
exclusive right to the use of the surface for the purpose of
such reduction, or for any other purpose, not prohibited by
law, but, to the contrary, concedes that right, as inherent in
the title to the land, and subject only to the control of the
state, in the exercise of its police power; and the right may
be sold, as may be any other right, and may carry with it
the right to the oil and gas that may be found and reduced
to possession.169
Hence, as article 2 of the Louisiana Mineral Code instructs,170
the Civil Code would regulate this issue. Civil Code article 801
says that “[t]he use and management of the thing held in indivision
is determined by agreement of all the co-owners.”171
Further, because oil and gas activities are not the normal or usual
activities conducted on land, such activities would constitute
“substantial alterations or substantial improvements.” In that regard,
the Civil Code further provides that “[s]ubstantial alterations or
167. “Whilst it is true that ‘oil and gas, in place, are not subject to absolute
ownership as specific things apart from the soil of which they form part,’
nevertheless it is equally well settled that the owner of the soil has alone the
right to sever and appropriate them, which right, of course, he may cede to
another.” Allies Oil Co. v. Ayers, 92 So. 720, 720 (La. 1922).
168. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:6 (2000).
169. Strother v. Mangham, 70 So. 426, 440 (La. 1915) (citations omitted).
170. “The provisions of this Code are supplementary to those of the
Louisiana Civil Code and are applicable specifically to the subject matter of
mineral law. In the event of conflict between the provisions of this Code and
those of the Civil Code or other laws the provisions of this Code shall prevail. If
this Code does not expressly or impliedly provide for a particular situation, the
Civil Code or other laws are applicable.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:2.
171. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 801 (2008).
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substantial improvements to the thing held in indivision may be
undertaken only with the consent of all the co-owners.”172
Thus, in the absence of an agreement providing a different
level of consent, unanimity would be needed for one co-owner to
conduct E&P operations on the co-owned land.173
VIII. FORM, DURATION, AND EXTENT OF CONSENT
A. Introduction
The Louisiana Mineral Code neither prescribes the form of the
consent that articles 164, 166, or 175 envision, nor stipulates how
it might be manifested.174 Obviously, to avoid controversy (an
admittedly radical thought in our “All in the Family” situation), a
party desiring to conduct operations on co-owned land or a coowned servitude should acquire such consent in writing and should
be as clear and concise as possible.175
B. Form of Consent
1. Must Consent Be Granted in Writing?
Examining the issue of form in a different way, the issue of
whether a co-owner’s verbal granting of consent may be proven by
oral testimony must be considered. More precisely, because the coowned land constitutes immovable property, is such evidence
precluded by the “parol evidence exclusionary rule”?176
No reported decision has considered this precise issue in the
context of the relevant articles. However, one case suggests that
the “parol evidence exclusionary rule” should not be an obstacle to
proving, by other than written evidence, the granting of consent to
operate.177
172. Id. art. 804.
173. The law noted supra in Part II.A would provide the guidance under such
circumstances.
174. Neither did the Civil Code, insofar as it pertained to the use of a predial
servitude created by a co-owner, “provide any particular form or manner by
which the consent is given.” Superior Oil Producing Co. v. Leckelt, 181 So. 462,
467 (La. 1938).
175. In a non-oil-and-gas case, it has been held that “the law does not require
that the consent of co-owners be written in order to lease property.” Schroth v.
Seminole Supermarket, Inc., 829 So. 2d 597, 600 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
176. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1832 (2008); id. art. 1839.
177. “The management and development of this [co-owned] property contains
issues which are wholly distinct from the ownership of the property and the
admission of parol evidence to establish a management agreement concerning the
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2. Should the Consent, if Obtained in Writing, Be Recorded?
If the consent is obtained in writing (and the author hopes that
this Article demonstrates that there are a variety of reasons why it
should be), the question arises as to whether it must (or should) be
recorded. The easy answer is, “Yes, why not record it?” It would be
“money well spent.”
But that easy response does not answer the question of whether
it must be recorded. It is submitted that, without regard to the
obvious prudence of doing so, the answer is, “No, it is not necessary
to record it.” The notion of “consent,” for these purposes, might be
likened to the concept of “authority” to act, such that under
applicable law, a “matter of . . . authority . . . and a similar matter
pertaining to rights and obligations evidenced by a recorded
instrument are effective as to a third person although not evidenced
of record.”178 In the context of this Article, the reference to “a
recorded instrument” would be to the juridical act creating the
mineral servitude (whether by grant or reservation) or to a mineral
lease.
3. Must Consent Be Granted by a Mineral Lease?
The 80% rule—in the circumstances when it applies—only
addresses the issue of whether operations can be conducted on the
ground. The rule does not mean that a co-owner cannot grant a
mineral lease unless the consent of not less than 80% of the coowners is obtained. Consistent with this observation, article 166 of
the Louisiana Mineral Code says that “the lessee . . . may not
exercise his rights thereunder without consent of co-owners
owning at least an undivided eighty percent interest in the land.”179
While a mineral lease is, quite obviously, a juridical act, which,
by its very nature, necessarily grants consent to operate,180 and is
the more typical vehicle by which consent is manifested, the

property would not be violative of LSA-C.C. Arts. 1832 and 1839.” Riddle v.
Simmons, 589 So. 2d 89, 92 (La. Ct. App. 1991). “In cases such as this, however,
where the claimants are co-owners of the immovable property, we see no reason to
exclude parol evidence to establish agreements concerning the management,
exploitation, development or sharing of profits with reference to the co-owned
property.” Id. at 93.
178. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3339 (2007) (emphasis added).
179. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:166 (2000) (emphasis added).
180. “A mineral lease is a contract by which the lessee is granted the right to
explore for and produce minerals. A single lease may be created on two or more
noncontiguous tracts of land . . . .” Id. § 31:114. But see infra Part VIII.F.
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articles do not require that a mineral lease be acquired to grant
consent. In other words, a mineral lease is sufficient, but not
necessary, to grant the requisite consent of a co-owner.
So, while the granting of a mineral lease is one thing, the
conduction of operations thereunder is another matter. A mineral
lease can be granted, without regard to the level of consent, but the
lessee cannot operate on the leased premises without the requisite
level of consent. Hence, permission can also be granted by a
simple writing that expresses the “consent” of the owner to the
conduction of operations. Such a “simple writing” may be as
concise as the following, to-wit: “As a co-owner of Blackacre, I
hereby grant my consent that you may conduct oil and gas
activities and drilling operations on the land. I expressly retain all
rights to production attributable to my interest in the land.”
While a written document of this sort would suffice as the
granting of consent by a co-owner, is it a mineral lease? As noted
above, a mineral lease is defined as “a contract by which the lessee
is granted the right to explore for and produce minerals.”181
Although this codal definition does not explicitly require that a
traditional royalty be reserved or that any of the other customary
features of a mineral lease be included, the reference to lessee
would conjure the traditional attributes of a mineral lease such that
this “simple writing” would not be deemed for any purpose to
constitute a mineral lease. This observation is not a matter of mere
semantics or academic intrigue; it is important for a variety of
purposes.182
4. Can Tacit Consent Be Inferred from a Co-owner’s Conduct?
As noted previously, the court in the early case of Carroll
noted that “the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land has not
the right to exploit the land for oil and gas without the consent,
implied or express, of his co-owner, and not having this right
himself he cannot confer it upon a lessee.”183
181. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:114.
182. For example, an interest that is not subject to a mineral lease is, selfevidently, “unleased,” such that the owner of that interest (if the Commissioner
of Conservation unitizes the well) has a right and remedy under the Well Cost
Reporting Statute, id. § 30:103.1–103.2 (2007), but is not subject to the Risk Fee
Act, id. § 30:10(A)(2) (Supp. 2013). See Patrick S. Ottinger, After the Lessee
Walks Away—The Rights and Obligations of the Unleased Mineral Owner in a
Producing Unit, in FIFTY-FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 59
(Patrick H. Martin ed., 2008).
183. Gulf Refining Co. of La. v. Carroll, 82 So. 277, 301 (La. 1919) (emphasis
added).
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Although admittedly arising in a different context (the need for
a lessor’s consent to a proposed transfer of a commercial lease),
the permissibility of consent that is not in writing, but which might
be inferred by the party’s action or inaction, was discussed by an
early court as follows:
The tacit consent suffices, even when it has been said that
the consent in writing of the lessor shall be necessary. The
necessity of a writing has been stipulated only to facilitate
the proof: the parties did not intend to subordinate the
validity of the sub-lease to a writing. Even had they so
intended, the verbal or tacit consent would still be sufficient,
because the lessor could not bind his hands and condemn
himself not to be able to consent without a writing; therefore
if he gives his consent without writing, a new agreement is
formed by virtue of which the sub-lease is admitted by the
lessor.184
Guided by this early case, if tacit consent suffices even in the
face of an explicit requirement that it be in writing, a fortiori, tacit
consent should suffice where, as here, there is no legal requirement
for a writing.
In Superior Oil Producing Company v. Leckelt,185 it was held
that although a mineral servitude granted by less than all of the coowners “would not be null but its execution would be suspended
until the consent of the coowners was given,”186 those nonsignatory
“coowners acquiesced in the payment of the royalties to [the mineral
servitude owner]” and that this acquiescence “was in effect the
giving of consent by the coowners.”187
While not precisely involving tacit consent, it was held in
another case that “execution of the division orders and the receipt
of [a co-owner’s] share of the proceeds of all of the oil produced
and sold was a complete ratification by defendant of the drilling
operations conducted by plaintiff on the whole property.”188
Although tacit consent to the conduction of operations has been
found in these cases, it must be observed that this case predated the
adoption of the amendments in 1988 with the resultant requirement
that the proviso be met. Because the codal requirement is really
“consent plus,” it remains to be seen if a court would infer consent
where, despite the open and notorious nature of the co-owner’s
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

McWilliams v. Dawes, 5 Pelt. 577, 593 (La. Ct. App. 1922).
181 So. 462 (La. 1938).
Id. at 467.
Id. at 468.
Connette v. Wright, 98 So. 674, 676 (La. 1924).
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action, there is no showing that the operator has satisfied the
proviso of the relevant article.
C. Duration of Consent
Unresolved is the issue of whether the consent has a term—
does it only apply to one then-anticipated distinct operation? Or,
does the consent continue to apply to future operations beyond the
first anticipated operation for the duration of the mineral right in
question?
If the consent is granted with respect to one identified
operation, it would—in the absence of greater clarity—likely be
construed to be limited to that distinct operation, and not to apply
to future, nondescribed operations. Conversely, if it is stated in
more general language without a reference to a specific well or
other activity, it would likely be construed as continuing, without
limitation as to time.
Is the success vel non of the first operation, to which the
requisite consent was granted, relevant to these questions? If the first
operation pursuant to consent is a dry hole, rather than a producer,
must new consent be obtained, or does such consent continue to
apply to subsequent operations?
Because neither the Mineral Code nor the interpretive
jurisprudence provide answers to these questions, suffice it to say
that the party desiring to operate should obviate these compelling
issues by obtaining the consent in writing.
D. Revocability of Consent
Additionally, can the consent, once granted and reaching the
requisite level, be revoked? And, if so, what level of revocation is
necessary to rescind that previously granted consent?
If revocable at all, what activities, preliminary to spudding the
well,189 taken by the operator in reliance on the previously granted
consent will be deemed to preclude, under a theory of detrimental
reliance or estoppel, a revocation of consent?190 If the lessee,
189. “[T]he term to ‘spud in’ has a well-defined meaning in the oil industry
as the first boring of the hole in the ground, that is, the first actual penetration of
the earth with a drilling bit . . . .” Hilliard v. Franzheim, 180 So. 2d 746, 747
(La. Ct. App. 1965).
190. In Louisiana, a claim of detrimental reliance is grounded in Louisiana
Civil Code article 1967, which reads as follows:
Cause is the reason why a party obligates himself. A party may be
obligated by a promise when he knew or should have known that the
promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his detriment and
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having obtained the requisite consent, then proceeds to sell
interests in its “drilling deal,” can consent thereafter be revoked
after parties have relied to their detriment upon the consent
previously granted? This significant contingency or potentiality, if
none other, argues forcefully for obtaining consent in writing with
sufficient clarity.
E. Transfer of Lease After Obtaining Consent
If a lessee under a mineral lease or leases that, in the aggregate,
cover(s) less than all of the co-owners in a tract of land obtains the
requisite level of consent from the nonsignatory co-owner(s) and
thereafter transfers the lease(s), does the assignee of such lease(s)
get the benefit of such previously granted consent? That is to say,
is the consent itself transferable, and, if so, does it necessarily
attend the transfer of the lease(s), or must it be specially
assigned?191
Neither the Louisiana Mineral Code nor jurisprudence
addresses this precise question; yet, it might be argued that, there
being no express requirement that the consent be in writing, and,
further, that tacit consent has been found in at least one case,192 the
consent follows the lease(s) when transferred. Although articles
128193 and 131194 of the Louisiana Mineral Code may be facially
interpreted to support this observation, this is a rather tenuous basis
to resolve the important issue of the successor lessee’s right to
operate pursuant to previously granted consent. It is for this reason,
if no other, that it is prudent to obtain the consent in writing and to
expressly transfer it to the assignee or sublessee.

the other party was reasonable in so relying. Recovery may be limited
to the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a result of the
promisee’s reliance on the promise. Reliance on a gratuitous promise
made without required formalities is not reasonable.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1967 (2008).
191. This notion of rights as being either “personal” or “real” has been
judicially examined in the context of the “subsequent purchaser doctrine.” See,
e.g., Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 79 So. 3d 246 (La. 2011).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 184–88.
193. “To the extent of the interest acquired, an assignee or sublessee acquires
the rights and powers of the lessee and becomes responsible directly to the
original lessor for performance of the lessee’s obligations.” LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 31:128 (2000).
194. “A mineral lessor must accept performance by an assignee or sublessee
whether or not the assignment or sublease is filed for registry.” Id. § 31:131.
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F. Mineral Lease Containing a “No Surface Operations” Clause
A party desiring to operate on co-owned land often “bundles”
the consent represented by its mineral lease(s) with the consent
vested in another party who holds a mineral lease from one or
more other co-owners of the targeted leased premises.195 If any of
the mineral leases contains a “no surface operations” clause, yet
the undivided interest represented by the lease is necessary to reach
the requisite level of consent, the operator could not operate on the
surface of the co-owned land without aggregating—from any
source—the unrestricted or unconditional consent of at least 80%
of the co-owners “in the land” or “in the servitude,” as the case
may be.
Conversely, if the operator obtains the consent of at least 80%
of the co-owners in the land or servitude, it can conduct operations
thereon, notwithstanding that any other co-owner (whose interest is
not counted in the attainment of the requisite 80%) might have
granted a lease with a “no surface operations” clause. This is so
because, having obtained the consent of at least 80% of the coowners, and having complied with the proviso, it has the right
operate at that level, the consent (or absence of consent) of the
balance of the co-owners being immaterial.
Also unanswered is the question of whether the party lessor
who, by reason of the “no surface operations” clause contained in
the lease, did not give consent to operate on the surface of the
lands, has a claim for damages or injunction against the operator
who is not its lessee. The answer should be “no” because the
operator—having obtained the requisite level of consent—does not
need any additional consent, provided that it has complied with the
requirements of the relevant article.
The attainment of consent is one thing; the repudiation of a
contractual commitment is another. Thus, if the lessee under a “no
surface operations” clause participates (by way of financial
support) in drilling operations conducted by another party who has
independently attained the requisite level of unconditional consent
from other co-owners of the land, the lessee might be subject to a
claim for damages for violating the terms of its lease.196 However,
the lessor under such a restricted lease should not be able to enjoin
195. This “bundling” might be accomplished by a joint operating agreement,
a participation agreement, a “dry hole letter,” or a farm-in agreement executed
by the working interest owners. See Patrick S. Ottinger, Be Careful What You
Ask for: Subsequent Operations Under the Model Form Operating Agreement,
in SIXTY-THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW ch. 7 (2012).
196. “If a mineral lease is violated, an aggrieved party is entitled to any
appropriate relief provided by law.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:134.
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the drilling operations if the operator has accumulated the requisite
level of consent without regard to the interest of that lessor.
IX. DOING THE MATH
Calculating the requisite consent is simple under articles 164
and 166—it is necessary to get the consent of at least 80% of the
co-owners “in the land” to allow a person to operate on the coowned land. This consent may be granted through either a mineral
servitude granted by less than all of the co-owners or a mineral
lease granted by less than all of the co-owners “in the land.”
By its nature, article 175 works differently. This article
addresses the rights of co-owners of a discrete, co-owned mineral
servitude—either personally or through another—to operate on the
land burdened by the servitude. In this situation, the consent needed
is 80% of the co-owners “in the servitude.”
Thus, regardless of the size or quantification of the mineral
servitude, if the mineral servitude is co-owned, no E&P operations
may be undertaken on the burdened land without the consent of not
less than 80% of the co-owners “in the servitude.” For example, if
the mineral servitude pertains to, say, one-half of the minerals in
the land,197 and if such servitude is owned by, say, ten persons,
then, at least eight of those co-owners must consent so that
operations may be conducted pursuant to that servitude—eight out
of ten is 80%.
One must note that eight of ten owners of a mineral servitude
in and to one-half of the minerals represent, in the vernacular, a
“net” 40% interest in the entire minerals in and under the land.
There is no need to secure the consent from the owners of an
additional 40% interest in the minerals in and under the land—it is
unnecessary to get to 80% of the whole interest in the land or
minerals. Rather, what is necessary is to obtain the consent of the
owners’ 80% of the mineral servitude in question. The interest of
the party who has granted the mineral right is included in the
calculation of the 80%.
Illustrative of this proposition is the case of Superior Oil
Producing Company v. Leckelt, wherein a widower and five
children granted a mineral lease.198 After the lease was granted, the
197. Although it is sometimes so called, this is not a half-mineral servitude.
Rather, it is a full mineral servitude in and to one-half of the minerals. See, e.g.,
Clark v. Tensas Delta Land Co., 136 So. 1, 2 (La. 1931) (stating that what the
defendant “owned was not half of the right to the minerals, but the right to half
of the minerals, in Clark’s land”).
198. Superior Oil Producing Co. v. Leckelt, 181 So. 462, 463 (La. 1938).
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children’s father died, leaving his five children, who thereupon
owned the entire property in indivision, one-fifth each, subject to
the existing lease.199
During the term of the lease, one of the children, Richard
Leckelt, executed a mineral deed to William Campbell conveying
“an undivided on[e]-half interest in all the minerals that Richard
Leckelt owned in and under the property.”200
Thereafter, Richard Leckelt executed a mineral deed to P. S.
Moore “conveying an undivided one-half interest in all the minerals
that he owned in and under the property.”201
In both instances, the mineral deeds were made subject to the
then-existing mineral lease.202 The outstanding mineral lease expired
and was released.203 Thereafter, but within ten years of the last use
of the servitude,204 mineral leases were “acquired . . . from all the
co-owners, except Richard Leckelt, and from all the outstanding
holders of minerals rights.”205 A well was drilled pursuant to this
lease.206
After Richard Leckelt challenged the validity of this latter lease,
the lessee under the subsequently granted mineral lease sued to
cancel a mineral lease granted by Richard Leckelt and other
documents that the plaintiff alleged had “cast a cloud upon
plaintiff’s titles.”207
Richard Leckelt, a defendant, contended that the lease was
invalid because, as a co-owner of the property, his consent was
necessary.208 The court rejected this contention, saying that
Richard Leckelt consented to the establishment of the
servitude and he would be estopped from preventing
William Campbell from exercising the servitude under the
provisions of article 739209 and cannot prevent the exercise
of the servitude by objecting on the ground that the consent
199. See id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 463–64.
204. “A mineral servitude is extinguished by: prescription resulting from
nonuse for ten years . . . .” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:27(1) (2000).
205. Leckelt, 181 So. at 464.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 464.
209. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 715 (2008) (“A co-owner who has
consented to the establishment of a predial servitude on the entire estate owned
in indivision may not prevent its exercise on the ground that the consent of his
co-owner has not been obtained.”).
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of the other coproprietors has not been given. Furthermore
he would be estopped from preventing William Campbell
from exercising the servitude by derogating from or
destroying his own grant.210
The court upheld the mineral lease granted by the co-owners of
the land and by the owner of the mineral servitude created by
Richard Leckelt.211
X. THE PROVISO
A. The Legislature Lowers the Threshold but Introduces a Proviso
When the Louisiana Legislature amended the three articles in
1986 to lower the consent threshold from 100% to 90%, there was
no further requirement on the part of the party desiring to operate.
Thus, with the consent of 90% of the co-owners of either a tract or
a distinct mineral servitude, E&P operations could be conducted
without any further showing or condition.
However, in 1988, when the Legislature amended the three
articles to lower the consent threshold from 90% to 80%, it added a
proviso to each article. The proviso in each of the three articles
requires “that he [that is, the person who desires to conduct E&P
operations] has made every effort to contact such co-owners and, if
contacted, has offered to contract with them on substantially the
same basis that he has contracted with another co-owner.”212
B. Unanswered Questions
This language presents a few unanswered questions. Noting
that the articles require that “every effort” be made to contact the
other co-owners, and that the adjective reasonable does not modify
those words, what effort “to contact” will be deemed to be
sufficient or, more importantly, will be deemed to fall short of
constituting “every effort”? Reminiscent of the famous utterance of
our 42nd president, it “depends upon what the meaning of the word
[‘every’] is.”213

210. Leckelt, 181 So. at 467.
211. Id. at 468.
212. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:164, :166, :175 (2000).
213. See 1998: Clinton’s Grand Jury Testimony Released, BBC HOME (Sept.
21, 1998), http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/21/newsid
_2525000/2525339.stm.
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Is the phrase “every effort” intended to be read literally, or
does it mean “every reasonable effort”?214 If a lessee cannot locate
an owner using conventional methods, does the lessee have to
advertise in a newspaper in an attempt to ascertain the absentee’s
whereabouts? What effort will be deemed to fail to constitute the
making of “every effort” to contact these parties?
In the absence of unanimous consent, how does a title
examiner issue an opinion that the unsuccessful efforts “to contact”
the yet-to-consent co-owner are nevertheless sufficient to
constitute “every effort,” and, thus, that the proviso has been
satisfied such that E&P operations can be lawfully conducted even
without the consent of the parties who have not been contacted?
Who is to be contacted? The articles say, “such co-owners.”
But who are “such co-owners”? Grammatically, the word such, as
used in this sentence, seems to refer to those co-owners who have
already consented.215 However, logic suggests that it probably
refers to all co-owners with whom the lessee (or other party
desiring to operate) has not yet contracted.
Those who are contacted must be “offered [the opportunity] to
contract . . . on substantially the same basis that [the party desiring
to operate] has contracted with another co-owner.”216 Does the
proviso essentially impose a statutory “most favored nations”
clause?217 To whose “other contract” or “basis [of terms]” is this to
be compared? What, for these purposes, does “another co-owner”
mean?
What if the lessee has reached five different deals with five
distinct co-owners—different bonus, rental, royalty, primary term,
Pugh clause term, other specific provisions, etc.? What does
214. In several articles of the Louisiana Mineral Code, a statement or legal
requirement is modified by a standard of reasonableness. Thus, article 11(A) of
the Mineral Code requires “reasonable regard” in the exercise of rights, LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:11(A) (Supp. 2013); article 22 limits use of a mineral
servitude to that which is “reasonably necessary” and requires restoration of the
surface “at the earliest reasonable time,” id. § 31:22 (2000); article 29 requires a
“reasonable expectation” for a dry hole to constitute a “good faith operation,” id.
§ 31:29; and numerous articles allude to a “reasonably prudent operator,” e.g.,
id. § 31:122. The absence of such a modifier in these articles could be relevant.
215. “Where the word [such] modifies a term, that term is limited to the
previous identification of that same term within the statute.” Ouachita Parish
Sch. Bd. v. Ouachita Parish Supervisors Ass’n, 362 So. 2d 1138, 1141 (La. Ct.
App. 1978) (case actually involved the modifying term said, but the conclusion
to be drawn is the same). See also Mathews v. Goodrich Oil Co., 471 So. 2d 938
(La. Ct. App. 1985); Avatar Exploration, Inc. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 933 F.2d
314 (5th Cir. 1991).
216. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:164, :166, :175.
217. See supra note 119.
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“substantially the same basis” mean? Does the operator discharge
its duty under the proviso by merely offering “to contract,” but
only on the terms most favorable to it? Can the co-owner so
contacted insist that it be offered the opportunity to contract on the
terms which are most favorable to it, failing which, the proviso has
not been met? A Rubik’s Cube comes to mind.
Is the implication that unless the lessee has tried to contact and
contract with all co-owners, his operations under lease(s) from,
say, 95% of the co-owners could be opposed by non-contracting
parties? What standard of proof will be required to demonstrate
that the lessee has complied with the proviso (or has made “every
effort” to do so)? Should all offers to lease be in writing?
In view of these unanswered issues, it is appropriate to again
ask the question: How can a title examiner approve title for drilling
purposes under these circumstances?
C. The “Other” Contract
Although each of the three articles uses the word as a verb and
not a noun, the reference to contract is a bit uncertain when one
considers that, as noted above, the requisite consent may be granted
and obtained by a simple writing, involving no consideration. As
previously noted, it is not necessary that the operator acquire a
mineral lease, only that “consent” be obtained.
The “contract” to which article 164 refers would seemingly be
a mineral deed because it seems to contemplate a third person,
other than one of the co-owners, who seeks to operate pursuant to a
mineral servitude.
The “contract” that article 166 contemplates would apparently
be a mineral lease because it seems to anticipate a third person,
other than one of the co-owners, who seeks to operate under a
mineral lease.
The “contract” to which article 175 refers would presumably
be a simple statement of consent because, by definition, it does not
seem to envision a third person but rather one of the owners of the
co-owned mineral servitude. Given the context regulated by
Article 175, the use of the word contract seems somewhat
misplaced and is probably the result of inadvertence in the
legislative drafting process, which likely duplicated the three
articles.
XI. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF A NONCONSENTING OWNER
The last sentence of each of the relevant articles recognizes that
a party who does not grant its consent cannot be charged with any
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portion of the costs incurred in the operation. This is consistent
with general law, which rarely imposes personal liability on a party
who has not consented to or agreed to participate in the cost, risk,
and expense of the drilling of a well. However, as a corollary, the
interest of the nonconsenting owner is liable, on an in rem basis,
for such owner’s proportionate share of the drilling costs.218
The court in Arkansas Fuel Oil Corporation v. Weber affirmed
the proposition that “while the right of an owner to refrain from
exercising his right of ownership is absolute, he is nevertheless,
precluded from the enjoyment of profits without participation in
the expenses incurred in the production of such profits.”219
Another example of this proposition is found in Davis Oil
Company v. Steamboat Petroleum Corporation where the Supreme
Court stated: “A non-operating owner of a mineral interest, who
does not consent to operations within a compulsory drilling unit by
an operating owner, has no liability for the costs of development
and operations except out of his share of production.”220
The verbiage of each of the relevant articles is identical in
saying that the nonconsenting co-owner “has no liability for the
costs of development and operations, except out of his share of
production,”221 except that article 166 makes reference to “the
costs of development and operations or other costs.”222 Assuming
that it was intentional (and even meaningful), it is unapparent why
this article (addressing the granting of a mineral lease by a coowner of land) would justify this different formulation.
XII. APPLICATION OF CONSENT REQUIREMENTS TO THE CONDUCT
OF SEISMIC ACTIVITIES ON CO-OWNED LANDS OR CO-OWNED
MINERAL SERVITUDES
By reason of legislative amendments in 1995,223 article 166—
in addition to specifying the requisite consent necessary to conduct
E&P operations under a mineral lease granted by less than all coowners—also requires the same level of consent to “operate”—
permit your author to change that word to “conduct activities”—
under “a valid lease or permit for geological surveys, by means of
a torsion balance, seismographic explosions, mechanical device, or
any other method.”224 Similarly, article 175 defines operations (for
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See Ottinger, supra note 182.
149 So. 2d 101, 108 (La. Ct. App. 1963).
583 So. 2d 1139, 1141 (La. 1991).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:164, :166, :175.
Id. § 31:166 (emphasis added).
Act No. 479, 1995 La. Acts 1264.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:166.
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purposes of that article) as including “geological surveys, by
means of a torsion balance, seismographic explosions, mechanical
device, or any other method.”225
These amendments to articles 166 and 175 were adopted in
response to the controversial 1994 decision in Jeanes v. G.F.S.
Company.226 In that case, the defendant conducted seismic
operations on a tract of land, which approximately 80 co-owners
owned.227 The seismic company claimed that it had procured the
“consent of 80% of the mineral servitude owners pursuant to La.
R.S. 31:175 and therefore it could conduct operations on the
property.”228 However, because a certain corporation, to which
most of the co-owners transferred their surface interest, “did not
own an interest in a mineral servitude on the land,” the court held
that article 175 “does not apply to this case.”229
The court further noted that “what was being conducted on this
land were seismic operations.”230 The court held that Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 30:217231 “is applicable to this case” and
stated as follows:
G.F.S. for its operations needed the consent of the owner of
the land irrespective of who owned the mineral rights. The
evidence is clear that G.F.S. obtained permission of more
than 80% of the landowners, since Wetlands is the owner
of the land, but did not obtain permission from Jeanes.
La. Civ. Code art. 801 provides that the use and management
of the thing held in indivision is determined by agreement of
all the co-owners. Since G.F.S. used the land for its seismic
exploration, it needed the consent of all the co-owners of the
land. It failed to get the consent of Jeanes and is therefore
liable to her.232
Prior to 1995, the term operations, as it appears in several
articles of the Louisiana Mineral Code, was used in the context of
225. Id. § 31:175.
226. 647 So. 2d 533 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
227. Id. at 534.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 534–35.
230. Id. at 535.
231. This statute requires the consent of the “owner or the party or parties
authorized to execute geological surveys, leases, or permits as provided in the
Louisiana Mineral Code” prior to conducting geophysical surveys. LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 30:217(A)(1) (2007).
232. Jeanes, 647 So. 2d at 535 (citing State v. Evans, 38 So. 2d 140 (La.
1948); Picou v. Fohs Oil Co., 64 So. 2d 434 (La. 1953); Layne Louisiana Co. v.
Superior Oil Co., 26 So. 2d 20 (La. 1946)).
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“drilling or mining operations.”233 Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Bouterie v. Kleinpeter held that operations means and
relates to “the physical activity associated with the attempt to
discover or maintain production.”234 Geophysical, or seismic,
activities are simply not of this character.
To expand the definition of operations to include the conduct
of geophysical or seismic activities somewhat distorts that
important word because the traditional understanding of operations
has reference to those E&P activities that might be conducted
under a mineral lease or a mineral servitude, having the result of
maintaining the lease or interrupting prescription accruing against
the servitude. Clearly, geophysical or seismic activities would
neither maintain leasehold rights under a mineral lease nor
interrupt prescription accruing against a mineral servitude.235 They
are simply not operations, in the industry-accepted sense of the
word.236
The conduction of geophysical or seismic activities is not in
and of itself the exploitation of a mineral right. If anything, such
activities are more akin to a helicopter flyover of a potential
drillsite for the purpose of ascertaining or evaluating topographical
impediments to the conduction of E&P operations.237 While this
may be important, it is not per se relevant to the “use” of a mineral
right, and for this reason alone, the 1995 amendment to the
Louisiana Mineral Code seems unwarranted.
To legislatively address the disconcerting decision in Jeanes by
amending these articles of the Louisiana Mineral Code (and thereby
distorting the traditional understanding of operations) seems both
misplaced and a bit of overkill. A preferable manner of addressing
233. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:14, :30, :31, :32, :47, :60, :112,
:115, :123, :213(4), :213(6) (2000).
234. 247 So. 2d 548, 555 (La. 1971).
235. “Preparations for the commencement of actual drilling or mining
operations, such as geological or geophysical exploration, surveying, clearing of
a site, and the hauling and erection of materials and structures necessary to
conduct operations do not interrupt prescription.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:30.
236. Rather, as to mineral servitudes, “interruption takes place on the date
actual drilling . . . operations are commenced on the land burdened by the
servitude.” Id. (emphasis added).
237. But see Musser-Davis Land Co. v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 201 F.3d 561
(5th Cir. 2000) (holding that, unless excluded by contract, the right to conduct
seismic operations was inherent in the grant of a mineral lease). The court’s
analysis seemingly viewed seismic activities as being within the ambit of
exploration. That does not mean, however, that the conduction of geophysical
operations, without more, would serve to maintain leasehold rights in the same
manner as conventional drilling would. No one could seriously contend that the
conduction of geophysical operations over an anniversary date of a mineral lease
would maintain leasehold rights and abate the need to pay a delay rental.
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this issue would have been to clarify Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 30:217, which regulates the conduct of geophysical or
seismic operations.
To be sure, amending articles 166 and 175 of the Mineral Code
without a corresponding amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 30:217 only confuses the situation. The latter is a criminal
statute; therefore, one should diligently comply with it or not
violate its terms.238 The difficulty is that, while such criminal
statute does contain a definition of the term owner, it is a negative
definition, explaining what the term does not include.239 While that
definition is immaterial in a situation where the landowner
inherently owns its rights to the minerals underlying its lands (for
the reason that no mineral servitude exists),240 it is less than clear
in the opposite situation—that is, where the land is burdened by
one or more mineral servitudes.
Perhaps comfort can be taken from the fact that it is hard to
imagine any district attorney prosecuting anyone under this penal
statute, and if all else fails, perhaps the statute could be challenged
on a “void for vagueness” basis.241 But the fact remains that no
attempt was made to coordinate this statute with the articles of the
Mineral Code, resulting in uncertainty about which statute controls
in a co-ownership situation that articles 166 and/or 175 seemingly
address.242
XIII. WHAT IS THE WORTH OF A MINERAL RIGHT IF THE REQUISITE
CONSENT CANNOT BE OBTAINED?
Despite the language in the early cases that a mineral lease
granted by one co-owner is “null in so far as the co-owner is
238. “Whoever violates this Subsection shall be fined not less than five
hundred dollars nor more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned for not
less than thirty days nor more than six months, or both.” LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 30:217(A)(3) (2007).
239. “‘Owner’ as used herein shall not include a person or legal entity with only
a surface or subsurface leasehold interest in the property.” Id. § 30:217(A)(2).
240. See id. § 31:6 (2000) (“The landowner has the exclusive right to explore
and develop his property for the production of such minerals and to reduce them
to possession and ownership.”).
241. “A statute is unconstitutionally vague if an ordinary person of reasonable
intelligence is not capable of discerning its meaning and conforming his conduct
thereto.” State v. Hair, 784 So. 2d 1269, 1274 (La. 2001).
242. While one should not be unmindful of the instruction of article 2 of the
Mineral Code that “[i]n the event of conflict between the provisions of this Code
and those of the Civil Code or other laws[,] the provisions of this Code shall
prevail,” this is of little comfort in view of a criminal statute’s possible
relevance. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:2 (emphasis added).
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concerned,”243 the lease is still valid between the lessor and the
lessee. Actually, this is explicitly recognized in the text of article
166 where it states that a “co-owner of land may grant a valid
mineral lease . . . as to his undivided interest in the land but the
lessee or permittee may not exercise his rights thereunder without
consent of co-owners owning at least an undivided eighty percent
interest in the land.”244
A similar observation is drawn from article 164 under which,
by stating that a “co-owner of land may create a mineral servitude
out of his undivided interest in the land” and that “prescription
commences from the date of its creation,”245 one must conclude
that the servitude is valid and effective (inasmuch as prescription
has begun to accrue) but simply cannot be used unless and until the
requisite consent is acquired and the proviso is met. Hence, the
failure or inability to obtain the requisite consent does not render
the mineral right invalid or without any value whatsoever. Rather,
it simply means that no operations may be conducted on the
surface of the land pursuant to that mineral right.
If the mineral servitude owner cannot operate on the land
because it is unable to obtain the requisite consent as either article
164 or 175 requires or if the owner of a mineral lease cannot
operate on the land because it is unable to obtain the requisite
consent as article 166 requires, is there any value to the mineral
right which it holds?
Yes. Even though the owner of such a mineral right is not able
to conduct drilling operations on the surface of the land due to the
absence of the required consent, it is still a valid mineral servitude
or mineral lease. Thus, if the land in question is unitized with a
well drilled on another tract in the unit, then the mineral right is
valid and the owner thereof is entitled to participate in production
to the extent provided by law. Clearly, participation in a producing
unit on which the unit well is situated on another tract does not
violate the prohibition of the conduction of operations on the coowned tract of land.
It is also possible that E&P operations could be conducted on
the land pursuant to a different, discrete operational mineral right
for which the requisite consent has been obtained (or is
unnecessary because of the inapplicability of articles 164, 166, and
175). In such an event, the use of a mineral servitude inures to the

243. Gulf Refining Co. of La. v. Carroll, 82 So. 277, 279 (La. 1919).
244. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:166 (emphasis added).
245. Id. § 31:164.
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benefit of all co-owners of that servitude,246 and the mineral lease
would be maintained because the activities that are sufficient to
maintain the lease need not be performed personally.247
Although no case has considered the issue of whether the
mineral servitude could be exercised or the mineral lease could be
availed by the drilling of a directional well to be completed under
the tract of land (with no surface operations being conducted), it
would seem that without the requisite consent, no such operations
could take place. Article 490 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides:
Unless otherwise provided by law, the ownership of a tract
of land carries with it the ownership of everything that is
directly above or under it.
The owner may make works on, above, or below the land
as he pleases, and draw all the advantages that accrue from
them, unless he is restrained by law or by rights of
others.248
Hence, the rights of a co-owner to object, or certainly withhold
consent, are as availing with respect to the subsurface as they are
to the surface of the land.
XIV. CONCLUSION
Land that is owned in indivision is far from atypical. An
operator desiring to operate in a given area will most certainly
encounter at least one tract with multiple co-owners.
The Louisiana Legislature has struck a reasonable balance of
interests by abrogating a rule—as historic and traditional as it
might have been—that frustrated the desires of a large majority of
co-owners who wished to conduct oil and gas operations. The law
now embraces a rule that permits operations on the co-owned land
if at least 80% of the co-owners authorized it, while also affording
246. “A use or possession of a mineral right inures to the benefit of all coowners of the right.” Id. § 31:174. See also id. § 31:42–43.
247. “Performance may be rendered by a third person, even against the will
of the obligee, unless the obligor or the obligee has an interest in performance
only by the obligor.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1855 (2008). See also Delatte v.
Woods, 94 So. 2d 281 (1957) (rejecting an argument that operations must be
conducted by the lessee personally) (“The exercise of such rights could not be
accomplished if it were literally intended by the parties that the defendant
[lessee] should personally perform drilling obligations.”).
248. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 490 (2010). See also Logan v. State Gravel
Co., 103 So. 526, 527 (La. 1925) (noting that real estate cannot be destroyed
because “land” runs downward to the center of the earth).
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an opportunity for a reluctant co-owner to enjoy the same benefits
as other co-owners.
The public interest in the development of the state’s natural
resources is advanced inasmuch as wells that would otherwise not
be drilled (due to a small minority of co-owners) can now be
drilled without doing economic harm to the interests of those who
are not as enthusiastic as others.

